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 ___________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we are presented with two decisions of 
the district court dated May 18, 1995, and February 20, 1996, 
which reversed the orders of the bankruptcy court on two related 
bankruptcy cases.  We are asked to decide whether the district 
court erred in determining that the bankruptcy court was not 
authorized to compel the Internal Revenue Service to reallocate 
tax payments first to trust fund taxes.  We find that neither 11 
U.S.C. § 105 nor the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 
Energy Resources Co., Inc., 495 U.S. 545 (1990), authorized the 
bankruptcy court to order the Internal Revenue Service to 
reallocate tax payments under the particular facts here.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the decisions of the district court. 
 
 I. 
 We feel compelled to set forth the facts in detail 
because these bankruptcy cases are so heavily fact-intensive. 
 This consolidated appeal arises from two separate but 
related Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions filed by Michael and 
Morris Kaplan and Kaplan Building Systems, Inc. ("KBS").   KBS 
is a Pennsylvania corporation formed for the sole purpose of 
acquiring and operating a modular home manufacturing business.  
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Two brothers, Michael and Morris Kaplan, organized KBS and, at 
all relevant times, were its sole owners.  During 1990, KBS made 
only one payment of employment taxes in the approximate amount of 
$200,000.  That payment was not accompanied by a quarterly 
return.  For the four quarters of 1990, KBS failed to file timely 
returns and to pay to the United States approximately $2 million 
in federal employment taxes.  Of this amount, $1,564,468 were 
"trust fund" taxes.1   
 On February 11, 1991, Michael and Morris Kaplan filed 
two separate Chapter 11 petitions with the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, which were later 
consolidated.  KBS did not file for bankruptcy at that time.  
Although the Kaplans owned or were partners in approximately 89 
entities including KBS, they wanted to avoid preparing petitions 
and paying filing fees with respect to each of the entities.  The 
Kaplans thus sought an injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to enjoin 
specific creditors from instituting civil actions against the 
"non-filing" Kaplan businesses.  Although a number of KBS's other 
creditors were named in the injunctions, the IRS was not one of 
the defendant-creditors named in the orders, nor did the IRS 
participate in the matter.2  Invoking its powers under section 
                     
1.   Trust fund taxes refer to the employees' share of FICA 
and FUTA taxes required to be withheld by the employer and held 
in trust for the federal government pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 
7501(a).  Under I.R.C. § 6672, the IRS may collect unpaid trust 
fund taxes directly from the employer's officers or employees who 
are responsible for collecting the tax.  These individuals are 
commonly referred to as "responsible persons."  
2.   In their Brief in Support of Debtors' Motion to Compel 
the Internal Revenue Service to Reallocate Certain Payments, the 
Kaplans indicated that, at some later time but prior to June 15, 
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105, the bankruptcy court enjoined all of the named defendant-
creditors from proceeding to litigate claims against the non-
filing Kaplan entities.  The injunction dissolved ninety days 
after the effective date of the Kaplans' plan of reorganization. 
  In March of 1991, KBS filed its employment tax returns 
for the four quarters of 1990 and the corresponding taxes were 
assessed against KBS.  In lieu of instituting formal collection 
proceedings against KBS, the revenue officer determined that KBS 
could make installment payments to satisfy the debts, provided 
the Kaplans executed Forms 2751--Proposed Assessment of 100 
Percent Penalty--and consented to the assessment and collection 
of a responsible person's penalty in connection with KBS's unpaid 
trust fund taxes for 1990.  The Kaplans executed the necessary 
forms, thereby agreeing that the responsible person penalty could 
be assessed against them on or before December 31, 1995.  
 KBS and the IRS entered into two installment 
agreements.  The first installment agreement provided that KBS 
would pay the IRS $30,000 per month from October, 1991 through  
December, 1991; $35,000 per month from January, 1992, through 
March, 1992; $40,000 per month from April through June, 1992; and 
$50,000 from July, 1992, until December, 1994, when the balance 
would be paid in full.  Although the installment agreement 
contained several conditions, it did not address the allocation 
(..continued) 
1993, the IRS filed a proof of claim asserting an unliquidated 
KBS tax liability against the Kaplans in their individual 
bankruptcies.  The Kaplans filed a motion to expunge the IRS's 
claim, giving actual notice to the IRS; the IRS did not oppose.  
Consequently, the bankruptcy court entered an order on June 15, 
1993, expunging the IRS's claim. 
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of payments.  By the end of 1993, KBS defaulted on the first 
installment agreement. 
 A second installment agreement was drawn up in May, 
1994, which required KBS to make monthly payments of $60,000 from 
July of 1994 to March of 1995, and $100,000 from April of 1995 
until the debt was paid in full.  The installment agreement form, 
which had been revised in January, 1993, provided as one of the 
conditions that "[a]ll payments will be applied in the best 
interest of the United States."  On May 27, 1994, the general 
counsel for the Kaplan companies wrote to the revenue officer 
advising him that before executing the installment agreement, KBS 
deleted the language on the form providing that payments will be 
applied in the best interest of the United States.  The revenue 
officer informed KBS's counsel that the agreement could not be 
accepted by the IRS with the deletion of this condition.  KBS 
reversed the deletion, but reserved its right to further contest 
this allocation.  The IRS executed the second installment 
agreement on July 6, 1994 and KBS made payments through at least 
September of 1994.  The Kaplans claim they have personally funded 
KBS's tax liability payments in an amount in excess of $1 
million.      
 On January 29, 1993, the bankruptcy court confirmed the 
Kaplans' first amended plan of reorganization.  The confirmed 
plan dealt with some debts against the non-filing Kaplan 
entities.  With respect to tax claims against KBS, the plan 
provided: 
Notwithstanding anything in this Plan to the contrary, 
Tax Claims against Kaplan Building Systems, 
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Inc. shall be paid in accordance with and 
pursuant to installment agreements with 
Internal Revenue Service.3  
 On July 29, 1994, the Kaplans filed a motion in their 
individual bankruptcy cases to compel the IRS to reallocate the 
tax payments made by KBS (but funded by the Kaplans) to trust 
fund obligations.4 Without such reallocation, the Kaplans remain 
liable for 100% of KBs's unpaid trust fund taxes.  The bankruptcy 
court held a hearing at which the Kaplans argued that because 
reallocating the payments to KBS's trust fund liabilities would 
"enhance the probability the Kaplans will fully consummate their 
confirmed Plan which requires payments to be made to creditors 
over time," the bankruptcy court has the authority to and should 
compel the IRS to change the allocation of KBS's payments that 
had been funded by the Kaplans, based on the Supreme Court's 
holding in United States v. Energy Resources Co., Inc., 495 U.S. 
545 (1990).  The government opposed the motion, asserting that 
Energy Resources was inapposite here because the corporation was 
not a debtor in the Kaplans' bankruptcy proceedings and whatever 
the effect on KBS, the allocation of tax payments would not 
affect the reorganization of the Kaplans, who were the only 
debtors in the case.  The bankruptcy court concluded that this 
case was completely analogous to Energy Resources, even though 
                     
3.   Article III, Section 3.1(B)(ii) of Debtors' First 
Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization.    
4.   The KBS tax payments were made prior to the execution 
of the first installment agreement; these payments were also made 
pursuant to the first and second installment agreement s.  Thus, 
the time period involved runs from 1990 to September, 1994.   
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the structure here was not a textbook structure.  Because it 
found that the reallocation of KBS's taxes was necessary for the 
Kaplans' reorganization, the bankruptcy court entered an order 
directing the IRS to reallocate the prior payments to trust fund 
taxes. 
 The IRS appealed the bankruptcy court's order to the 
district court.  On May 18, 1995, the district court issued an 
order reversing the decision of the bankruptcy court, finding 
that because KBS was not a debtor in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy 
court was not authorized to order the IRS to reallocate payments 
made by KBS.  The district court noted that unlike Energy 
Resources, the bankruptcy court here lacked jurisdiction over KBS 
and, therefore, was without the power to order reallocation of 
the tax payments under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129 and 105, as those 
sections were not applicable.  The district court further held 
that the bankruptcy court could order retroactive allocation of 
tax payments.5  In dicta, the district court commented that KBS 
could file its own Chapter 11 petition, thereby subjecting itself 
to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.  The Kaplans filed a 
timely appeal to this court, which was stayed on September 12, 
1995, pending the district court's ruling on the same issue in 
the KBS bankruptcy case. 
                     
5.   In support of this holding, the district court cited In 
re Deer Park, Inc., 10 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Flo-
Lizer, Inc., 164 B.R. 79 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993), aff'd, 164 B.R. 
749 (S.D. Ohio 1994); and In re M.C. Tooling Consultants, 165 
B.R. 590 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1993). 
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 On June 2, 1995, KBS filed its own bankruptcy petition 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  On that same date, KBS 
filed several motions with the bankruptcy court, one of which 
asked the court to compel the IRS to reallocate the tax payments 
funded by the Kaplans on behalf of KBS to trust fund taxes.  KBS 
argued that reallocation of the tax payments was necessary for 
its successful reorganization, in that it would induce the 
Kaplans to provide KBS with new emergency funding necessary for 
the continued operation of KBS.  The IRS opposed the motion on 
the basis that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to 
reallocate, arguing that all of the payments at issue had been 
made pre-petition and that the debtor had failed to designate the 
manner in which they were to be applied.  The IRS applied the 
payments in accordance with IRS written policy, which requires 
that payments received be applied in a manner consistent with the 
best interests of the government, unless otherwise designated. 
 Having determined that it had jurisdiction over KBS, 
the bankruptcy court considered whether it had the authority to 
compel the IRS to reallocate the tax payments under Energy 
Resources.  Concluding that the reallocation was necessary to 
KBS's successful reorganization, the bankruptcy court entered an 
order, with retroactive effect, directing the IRS to reallocate 
the tax payments made by KBS to trust fund taxes. 
 The IRS appealed that order to the district court.  In 
reversing the decision of the bankruptcy court, the district 
court held that the Supreme Court's holding in Energy Resources 
did not displace the rule of law that the IRS may designate 
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voluntary payments in its best interests when the debtor fails to 
make a designation.  Having found that KBS never designated the 
manner in which its tax payments would be allocated, the district 
court found that the IRS was free to apply the tax payments 
towards KBS's outstanding corporate income tax. 
 On March 20, 1996, KBS filed a notice of appeal of the 
district court's order and moved to consolidate the KBS appeal, 
No. 96-5180, with the appeal in the Kaplans' bankruptcies, No. 
95-5409.  We granted that motion and consolidated the cases on 
June 10, 1996.  We have jurisdiction over these consolidated 
appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. 
  
 
 12 
 II. 
 At the core of the district court's ruling in the 
Kaplans' bankruptcy cases stands its finding that the bankruptcy 
court lacked jurisdiction over KBS.  Thus, we turn initially to 
the issue of whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over 
KBS in the Kaplans' bankruptcy cases.  We begin our analysis by 
examining 28 U.S.C. § 1334.   
 Section 1334(b) provides in relevant part that "the 
district courts shall have original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or 
arising in or related to cases under title 11."  28 U.S.C. § 
1334(b) (1990).  The bankruptcy courts, in turn, obtain 
jurisdiction by operation of 28 U.S.C. § 157, which allows the 
district courts to refer, to the bankruptcy courts, cases over 
which the district courts have jurisdiction pursuant to section 
1334.  Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service, 
895 F.2d 921, 926 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 We have held that in a case involving non-debtors, the 
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is to be determined solely by 28 
U.S.C. § 1334(b).  Id. at 926.  The Sixth Circuit has agreed with 
our conclusion.  In re Wolverine Radio Co., 930 F.2d 1132, 1140 
(6th Cir. 1991).  But cf. United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 
F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986).6  The dispute at issue here 
                     
6.   In United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546, 
1549 (11th Cir. 1986), the court of appeals refused to extend the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to the section 6672 
liabilities of the taxpayers who were not debtors under the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The court found that because the liability 
imposed under section 6672 was separate and distinct from that 
levied on the employer under sections 3102 and 3402 of the 
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arose between KBS and the IRS, two non-debtors, which the Kaplans 
are attempting to bring within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
court as a proceeding7 related to their Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
case.  Thus, we must turn to the meaning of the terms, "related 
to," in light of our explanation in Quattrone Accountants and 
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 In Quattrone Accountants, we were asked to decide 
whether, inter alia, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 11 U.S.C. § 5058 to determine a 
(..continued) 
Internal Revenue Code, it was irrelevant that the section 6672 
liability, if assessed against the responsible persons, would 
adversely affect the corporate debtor's reorganization.  Id. at 
1548-49 (citations omitted). 
 
 In Huckabee Auto, the corporation was the debtor and 
taxpayer; here, the situation is reversed:  the responsible 
persons, i.e., the Kaplans, are the debtors and the corporation, 
a non-debtor, is the taxpayer.  In addition, the court of appeals 
in Huckabee Auto failed to consider the bankruptcy court's 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).   
7.   The dispute between the IRS and KBS constitutes a civil 
"proceeding" as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1334.  
Proceeding "is used in a broad sense, referring to `[a]nything 
that occurs within a case,' including contested and uncontested 
matters."  Melodie Freeman-Barney, Notes and Comments, 
Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984:  Summing Up 
the Factors, 22 Tulsa L.J. 167, 180 (1986) (citing Collier on 
Bankruptcy (MB ¶ 3.01[1][c][ii] (15th ed. 1986)).  The 
legislative history to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 confirms 
that the term "proceeding" should be broadly interpreted.  H.R. 
Rep. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6400-6401. 
8.   Section 505(a)(1) provides in relevant part: 
 
. . . the court may determine the amount or legality of 
any tax, any fine or penalty relating to a 
tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not 
previously assessed, whether or not paid, and 
whether or not contested before and 
adjudicated by a judicial or administrative 
tribunal of competent jurisdiction. 
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non-debtor's tax liability under section 6672 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  Concluding that section 505 did not address a 
situation involving non-debtors9 and, therefore, neither limited 
nor granted jurisdiction, we turned to section 1334 to resolve 
the issue of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.  895 F.2d at 
925-26. 
 We examined the "related to" language of section 1334 
by looking at our previous explanation of those terms in Pacor, 
Inc. v. Higgins, supra.10  In Pacor, we explained that under 
section 1334, a civil matter is "related to" a bankruptcy 
proceeding when "the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably 
have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy." 
 743 F.2d at 994 (citations omitted).  We then stated that "[a]n 
action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the 
debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action 
(either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts 
upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate."  
Id.  Our analysis of the "related to" language of section 1334(b) 
                     
9.   The IRS assessed a section 6672 responsible person 
penalty against the debtor, Quattrone Accountants, for failing to 
pay withholding taxes on behalf of its client, United Dairy 
Farmers Cooperative Association (UDF).  Philip Quattrone, part 
owner and principal officer of the debtor, filed a complaint 
requesting the bankruptcy court to determine his section 6672 tax 
liability, as well as that of the debtor. 
10.   In Pacor, we held that a personal injury suit in which 
the defendant filed a third party claim seeking indemnification 
against the debtor, JohnsManville, was not related to the 
JohnsManville bankruptcy, reasoning that the outcome of the 
original personal injury action would not bind JohnsManville 
until a third party action was actually brought and tried.  743 
F.2d at 995. 
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was followed by the Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 
___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1493, 1498-99 (1995). 
 Applying these decisions to the facts of this case, we 
conclude that the dispute between the IRS and KBS is related to 
the Kaplans' bankruptcy proceeding.  Here the debtors, Michael 
and Morris Kaplan, agreed to section 6672 responsible person 
liability, in effect guaranteeing that KBS's trust fund taxes 
would be paid in full.  By virtue of their agreement with the 
IRS, if KBS failed to pay its trust fund taxes in full, the 
Kaplans would automatically be liable for the shortfall.  If the 
IRS is allowed to allocate the pre-petition tax payments it 
received to non-trust fund taxes, there is no effect on the 
Kaplans -- they are still 100% liable for the shortfall.  If, 
however, the IRS is not permitted to designate how the payments 
will be applied, and the bankruptcy court is allowed to order the 
IRS to allocate the pre-petition payments to trust fund taxes 
first, then the Kaplans' responsible persons liability is reduced 
to the extent that the trust fund tax liability of KBS is 
likewise reduced.  Thus, the outcome of the dispute between KBS 
and the IRS could conceivably affect, in a positive manner, the 
Kaplans' estate in bankruptcy. 
 We find, therefore, that the bankruptcy court had 
jurisdiction over the dispute between KBS and the IRS. 
 
 III. 
 Although we have determined that the bankruptcy court 
had jurisdiction over the non-debtors pursuant to section 1334, 
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our inquiry does not end there.11  Notwithstanding the bankruptcy 
court's jurisdiction, we must examine whether the bankruptcy 
court was authorized to issue the order to compel allocation of 
tax payments under the broad grant of equitable powers in 11 
U.S.C. § 105.12 
   Section 105(a) states in pertinent part:   
 The court may issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to 
carry out the provisions of this title.13 
That the bankruptcy court has the power under section 105 to 
enjoin creditors from proceeding in a state court against third 
parties where failure to enjoin would affect the bankruptcy 
estate has been recognized by numerous bankruptcy courts and two 
courts of appeals.14  Moreover, the Supreme Court in Energy 
                     
11.   We note that while the district court found incorrectly 
that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over KBS in the 
Kaplans' bankruptcy, this error is not fatal to its decision.   
12.   In In re Cardinal Industries, Inc., 109 B.R. 748, 752 
(Bankr. S.D. Oh. 1989), the bankruptcy court held that 
jurisdiction under section 1334 was not sufficient by itself to 
determine whether an injunction should issue; but rather, the 
court must examine, under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), whether the usual 
standards for injunctive relief are met. 
13.   The legislative history to section 105 is sparse.  The 
House Report states merely that section 105 is similar in effect 
to the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.  H.R. Rep. 595, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6273.  The 
legislative history further provides that section 105 authorizes 
a court of the United States to stay a state court action.  Id. 
at 6274. 
14.   In re Monroe Well Service, Inc., 67 B.R. 746, 750-51 
(Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1986); In re Otero Mills, 25 B.R. 1018, 1021-1022 
(D.N.M. 1982); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1002 
(4th Cir.), cert. den., 479 U.S. 876 (1986).  See also, National 
Labor Relations Board v. Superior Forwarding, Inc., 762 F.2d 695, 
698 (8th Cir. 1985) (Bankruptcy court is empowered under section 
105 to enjoin federal regulatory proceedings when those 
proceedings would threaten the assets of the debtor's estate).   
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Resources found the Bankruptcy Code implicitly authorized the 
bankruptcy courts to approve reorganization plans designating tax 
payments as either trust fund or non-trust fund, based on the 
bankruptcy courts' residual authority to approve reorganization 
plans under section 1123(b)(5) and 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
and on the statutory directive of section 105.  495 U.S. at 549. 
  Energy Resources involved two corporations which filed 
petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code:  Newport Offshore, Ltd. (Newport) and Energy Resources Co., 
Inc. (Energy Resources).  In the Newport bankruptcy, the IRS 
objected unsuccessfully to a provision in the reorganization plan 
which stated that Newport's tax payments would be applied to 
extinguish all trust fund tax liabilities prior to paying the 
non-trust fund portion of the tax liability.  The IRS appealed to 
the district court, which reversed the decision of the bankruptcy 
court.  The debtor appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit.   
 In the Energy Resources bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy 
court approved a reorganization plan which created a special 
trust to fund the corporation's federal tax liability.  When the 
IRS refused to apply a tax payment out of the special trust to 
Energy Resources' trust fund taxes, the trustee successfully 
petitioned the bankruptcy court to order the IRS to allocate the 
payment to trust fund taxes.  The IRS appealed this order to the 
district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court.   The IRS 
then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the First 
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Circuit.  The Newport and Energy Resources cases were 
consolidated on appeal. 
 The court of appeals reversed in In re Newport Offshore 
Ltd. and affirmed in In re Energy Resources Co.15  Initially, the 
court of appeals examined the characterization of tax payments 
made pursuant to a Chapter 11 reorganization plan as "voluntary" 
or "involuntary."16  Although the court of appeals concluded that 
the payments were involuntary, deferring to the IRS's 
interpretation of its own rules, it held that the "Bankruptcy 
Courts nevertheless had the authority to order the IRS to apply 
an `involuntary' payment made by a Chapter 11 debtor to trust 
fund tax liabilities if the Bankruptcy Court concluded that this 
designation was necessary to ensure the success of the 
reorganization."  871 F.2d at 230-34.   
 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of 
appeals, holding that regardless of whether the payments are 
properly characterized as "involuntary", a bankruptcy court has 
the authority to order the IRS to apply tax payments made by 
Chapter 11 debtor corporations to trust fund liabilities if the 
                     
15.   In re Energy Resources Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 223 (1st 
Cir. 1989).   
16.   IRS policy allows taxpayers who "voluntarily" pay their 
tax liability to designate the manner in which the tax payments 
will be applied.  Energy Resources, 495 U.S. at 548 (citations 
omitted).  Traditionally, a tax payment has been considered 
"involuntary" when it is made to "agents of the United States as 
a result of distraint or levy or from a legal proceeding in which 
the Government is seeking to collect its delinquent taxes or file 
a claim therefor."  United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 127 
(3d Cir. 1992) (citing Amos V. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 65, 69 
(1966)).   
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bankruptcy court determines that this designation is necessary to 
the success of a reorganization plan.  495 U.S. at 548-49.  To 
find such authority for the bankruptcy court, the Court looked to 
sections 1123, 1129, and 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Under 
sections 1123(b)(5) and 1129, the Court found that the Code 
"grant[ed] the bankruptcy courts residual authority to approve 
reorganization plans including `any . . . appropriate provision 
not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.'" 
 Id. at 549.  Turning to section 105, the Court noted that the 
Code also provides that bankruptcy courts may "`issue any order, 
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry 
out the provisions' of the Code."  Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 
105(a)).  The Court further noted that these "statutory 
directives are consistent with the traditional understanding that 
bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to 
modify creditor-debtor relationships."  Id.  (citations omitted). 
 The Court rejected the government's argument that 
bankruptcy court orders directing allocation to trust fund taxes 
conflict with sections 507(a)(7), 523(a)(1)(A), 1129(a)(11), and 
1129(a)(9)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code, provisions which protect 
the government's ability to collect delinquent taxes.  The Court 
found that the restrictions in those sections of the Code do not 
address the bankruptcy court's ability to designate whether tax 
payments are to be applied to trust fund or non-trust fund tax 
liabilities and, thus, did not preclude the court from issuing 
the type of orders involved here.  Id. at 550.      
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 The Court found equally unpersuasive the government's 
argument that it stands in a better position to have all of its 
debt discharged if the debtor corporation's tax payments are 
first applied to non-trust fund taxes because the debt that is 
not guaranteed will be paid off first.  The Court stated that 
while from the government's viewpoint this result is more 
desirable, it is an added protection not provided for in the Code 
itself.  Id.  Finally, the government contended that the 
bankruptcy court's orders contravened section 6672 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which permits the IRS to collect unpaid 
trust fund taxes directly from the "responsible" individuals.  
The government reasoned that if the IRS cannot designate a debtor 
corporation's tax payments as non-trust fund, the debtor might 
only be able to pay the guaranteed debt, leaving the government 
at risk for non-trust fund taxes.  Discarding this argument as 
well, the Supreme Court found that section 6672, by its terms, 
does not protect against this eventuality.  Id. at 551. 
 Despite the Supreme Court's finding that the residual 
authority of the bankruptcy court under sections 1123, 1129 and 
105(a) authorized the reallocation of tax payments, Energy 
Resources does not change the result here.  The facts in the 
Kaplans' bankruptcy cases simply do not provide the bankruptcy 
court with the authority to grant the relief sought by the 
Kaplans.  First and foremost, KBS, the taxpayer, was not the 
debtor.  Indeed, we agree with the IRS that Energy Resources does 
not reach the situation where a third party might benefit:  the 
Kaplans could not be deemed necessary to the success of KBS's 
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plan because at the time the payments were made, KBS did not have 
a reorganization plan.17  In addition, as KBS was not a debtor 
prior to June 1995, the IRS was not afforded the usual 
protections in a Chapter 11 reorganization:  a priority for 
specified tax claims, including trust fund taxes, and a provision 
making these tax debts nondischargeable, 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(7), 
523(a)(1)(A); the requirement that the bankruptcy court assure 
itself that the reorganization will succeed, 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(a)(11), making it more likely that the IRS will collect the 
tax liability; and a provision that the tax debt must be paid off 
within six years, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C). 
 As we stated in Pepperman, "the Court in Energy 
Resources consistently linked its holding with the fact of 
reorganization and the debtor's need for rehabilitation."  976 
F.2d at 130.  Because KBS had not filed its own Chapter 11 
petition, the bankruptcy court did not have before it all of the 
                     
17.   Although KBS and some of its creditors were being 
reorganized under the Kaplans' bankruptcies, the IRS was not 
listed as a creditor of KBS in the schedule of defendants in the 
section 105 stay litigation.  Moreover, the Kaplans' 
reorganization plan provided that the tax claims against KBS 
would be paid in accordance with the installment agreements with 
the IRS.  We note, however, that these installment agreements 
were voluntary agreements which KBS could, and eventually did, 
default on.  The fact that the Kaplans never sought the 
bankruptcy court's intervention with regard to the IRS's tax 
claims against KBS and, indeed, specifically provided in their 
plan that the normal rule pertaining to payment of allowed tax 
claims (i.e., allowed tax claims must be paid in full within 
fifteen days after the effective date of the plan or, pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C), paid in full over six years from the 
earlier of the assessment date or plan effective date), did not 
apply to the IRS's tax claims against KBS, mandates the 
conclusion that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to order 
the reallocation of KBS's tax payments.  
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claims and, therefore, could not have made an appropriate 
determination as to whether the KBS reorganization was likely to 
succeed.  Since this determination is a prerequisite to the 
Court's holding in Energy Resources, the bankruptcy court lacked 
the authority to order the IRS to reallocate tax payments in the 
Kaplans' bankruptcies.  We observed in Pepperman that "section 
105 does not `give the court the power to create substantive 
rights that would otherwise be unavailable under the Code,'" 
noting that Energy Resources does nothing to undermine this 
observation.  976 F.2d at 131 (citations omitted).  Further, 
"`[t]he fact that a [bankruptcy] proceeding is equitable does not 
give the judge a free-floating discretion to redistribute rights 
in accordance with his [or her] personal views of justice and 
fairness, however enlightened those views may be.'"  Id. (quoting 
Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 791 F.2d 524, 
528 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
 Because KBS, the taxpayer, was not a debtor under the 
facts here,18 the bankruptcy court was precluded from making an 
appropriate determination regarding the likelihood of KBS's 
successful reorganization as required by Energy Resources.  We 
hold, therefore, that the bankruptcy court lacked authority under 
section 105 to order the IRS to allocate KBS's tax payments in 
the Kaplans' bankruptcy. 
                     
18.   The IRS did not file a proof of claim against KBS in 
the Kaplans' bankruptcies.  KBS was organized as a corporation, 
not a partnership.  As a separate legal entity, KBS, in order to 
avail itself of the full protections and powers of the bankruptcy 
court, must itself be a debtor.  See, In re FTL, Inc., 152 B.R. 
61 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).  The tax payments at issue were pre-
petition and not made pursuant to a reorganization plan. 
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 IV. 
 Likewise in KBS's bankruptcy, we are compelled to find 
that the bankruptcy court lacked authority under section 105 to 
order the IRS to reallocate tax payments to trust fund taxes 
first.  The broad powers granted to the bankruptcy court under 
section 105 are insufficient alone to authorize a retroactive 
allocation of pre-petition tax payments.  Pepperman, 976 F.2d at 
131 ("section 105 does not `give the court the power to create 
substantive rights that would otherwise be unavailable under the 
Code.'") (citations omitted).  The bankruptcy court's equitable 
powers under section 105 are not triggered where, like the 
situation before us, the requirements of Energy Resources have 
not been met.19  Indeed, since a reorganization plan was not 
filed in the KBS bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court had no basis 
upon which to exercise its equitable authority under section 
105.20 
 We agree with the following inquiry set forth by the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to be made by the 
                     
19.   When the bankruptcy court here determined that 
reallocation was necessary to the successful reorganization of 
KBS, it did not have before it a plan of reorganization.  In 
Energy Resources, a reorganization plan existed under 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1123 and 1129.  In that situation, the bankruptcy court has 
the authority to oversee the reorganization and, under § 105, has 
the equitable power to do what is necessary to get the plan 
confirmed. 
20.   Thus, the bankruptcy court could not have assured 
itself, as it was required to do under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11), 
that the reorganization plan would succeed; and that the debtor 
would take no more than six years within which to structure the 
tax payments, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C). 
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bankruptcy court when assessing whether reallocation for tax 
payments is necessary to the successful reorganization of the 
debtor: 
upon consideration of the reorganization plan as a 
whole, in so far as the particular structure 
or allocation of payments increases the risk 
that the IRS may not collect the total tax 
debt, is that risk nonetheless justified by 
an offsetting increased likelihood of 
rehabilitation, i.e., increased likelihood of 
payment to creditors who might otherwise lose 
their money?  
 
In re Energy Resources Co., Inc., 871 F.2d at 234.  It is clear 
from the record that the bankruptcy court in KBS's case did not 
undertake to perform this analysis.  Thus, the holding by the 
Supreme Court in Energy Resources, which clearly took into 
consideration the existence of a reorganization plan, does not 
control the resolution of this case.21 
 We further note that all of the cases cited by KBS in 
support of retroactive allocation are factually distinguishable 
as they involved post-petition, post-confirmation tax payments.22 
 Appellants do not cite any authority which would support a 
retroactive allocation involving pre-petition payments not made 
                     
21.   The fact that the IRS had not challenged the bankruptcy 
court's determination that reallocation was necessary for a 
successful reorganization is not dispositive here, as that 
determination was prematurely reached.   
  
22.   In addition to Energy Resources, the appellants rely on 
In re Deer Park, Inc., 10 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993), and In re 
Flo-Lizer, Inc., 164 B.R. 79 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993),            
to support their contention that the allocation order may be 
applied retroactively.  In all three of these cases, the tax 
payments at issue were made post-petition, pursuant to an 
approved plan of reorganization. 
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pursuant to a reorganization plan.   Moreover, in asking us to 
approve the retroactive allocation of pre-petition tax payments, 
KBS is, in effect, asking us to extend the time applicable to 
preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547 well beyond that 
allowed by the Bankruptcy Code.  We find no basis in the 
Bankruptcy Code or other legal authority which would justify this 
treatment.  Accordingly, we find that retroactive allocation of 
pre-petition tax payments is not permitted.23    
    Because we find that Energy Resources does not 
apply here, we must turn to the common law regarding voluntary 
payments.  The parties have agreed that the tax payments at issue 
were made voluntarily.  "IRS policy has long permitted a taxpayer 
who `voluntarily' submits a payment to the IRS to designate the 
tax liability . . . to which the payment will apply."  In re 
Energy Resources Co., Inc., 871 F.2d at 227 (citing Rev. Rul. 79-
284, 1979-2 C.B. 83; Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 
(1978)) (other citations omitted); Pepperman, 976 F.2d at 127.  
This policy reflects the generally recognized common law rule 
between debtors and creditors that "the debtor may indicate which 
debt it intends to pay when it voluntarily submits a payment to a 
creditor, but may not dictate the application of funds that the 
creditor involuntarily collects from it."  Pepperman, 976 F.2d at 
127 (citing O'Dell v. United States, 326 F.2d 451, 456 (10th Cir. 
1964)) (citation omitted).   
                     
23.   To the extent that the district court in the Kaplans' 
bankruptcy cases ruled that retroactive allocation was allowed, 
that conclusion constitutes legal error.  
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 The long-standing policy of the IRS with regard to 
voluntary payments is reflected in IRS Policy Statement P-5-60, 
which provides: 
In determining the amount of the 100 percent penalty to 
be assessed in connection with employment 
taxes, any payment made on the corporate 
account involved is deemed to represent 
payment of the employer portion of the 
liability (including assessed and accrued 
penalty and interest) unless there was some 
specific designation to the contrary by the 
taxpayer.  The taxpayer, of course, has no 
right of designation in the case of 
collections resulting from enforced 
collection measures.  To the extent partial 
payments exceed the employer portion of the 
tax liability, they are considered as being 
applied against the trust fund portion of the 
assessment. 
 
1 Administration, CCH Internal Revenue Manual at 1305-15 (Mar. 
1981).  Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 C.B. 83, was promulgated in 
agreement with this policy.  Kinnie v. United States, 771 F.Supp. 
842, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1991), aff'd, 994 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 Rev. Rul. 79-284, modifying Rev. Rul. 73-305,24 1973-2 C.B.43, 
states that a taxpayer must provide specific written instructions 
                     
24.   Rev. Rul. 73-305, which provides that where no specific 
instructions are given by the taxpayer as to the application of a 
partial tax payment, the amount of the payment will be applied to 
tax, penalty, and interest, in that order, did not apply to 
withheld employment taxes.  Rev. Rul. 79-284 made Rev. Rul. 73-
305 applicable to withheld employment taxes by providing: 
 
Rev. Rule 73-305 applies to withheld employment taxes . 
. . where the taxpayer provides specific 
written instructions for the application of a 
voluntary partial payment.  If no designation 
is made by the taxpayer, the Internal Revenue 
Service will allocate partial payments of 
withheld employment taxes . . . in a manner 
serving its best interest. 
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for the application of a voluntary partial payment of withheld 
employment taxes.   
 Revenue rulings are entitled to great deference, but 
courts may disregard them if they conflict with the statute they 
purport to interpret or its legislative history, or if they are 
otherwise unreasonable.  Geisinger Health Plan v. C.I.R., 985 
F.2d 1210, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); Kinnie v. 
United States, 994 F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir. 1993); Amato v. 
Western Union Intern, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1411 (2d Cir. 1985); 
Certified Stainless Services, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 
1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1984).   The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in Kinnie specifically found that the IRS's 
interpretation of Rev. Rul. 79-284 was not unreasonable, nor did 
it conflict with any specific statute.  994 F.2d at 287.  The 
court of appeals further found that requiring the designation to 
be in writing serves an important purpose:  it prevents 
litigation over various oral statements and understandings.  Id. 
 Accordingly, the court upheld the IRS's application of voluntary 
tax payments in the best interest of the government absent a 
written instruction from the taxpayer.  Id.  See also, Slodov v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 238, 252 n. 15 (1978) (acknowledging IRS 
Policy Statement P-5-60 prevails unless the government is 
notified in writing that taxes are to be applied in a different 
manner).        
 The crucial issue before us is what constitutes an 
effective designation where voluntary payments are involved.  KBS 
would have us find that it effectively designated its payments to 
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be applied first to trust fund taxes because it had an 
"understanding" with the IRS that payments were to be applied in 
that manner and because the IRS failed to notify them to the 
contrary.  KBS further argues that to be effective, the 
designation need not be in writing.  The weight of authority, 
however, goes against this argument.  In addition, the cases 
cited by KBS to support their argument that the designation need 
not be in writing are factually distinguishable.25   
 We also reject KBS's contention that the language of 
the first installment agreement is consistent with its belief 
that payments were being applied to trust fund taxes first.  
While it is true that the first installment agreement does not 
contain any provisions contrary to the Kaplans' and KBS's beliefs 
that the payments would be applied first to trust fund taxes, 
this fact alone does not obviate the requirement that the 
taxpayers provide a written designation contemporaneously with 
their payment. 
                     
25.   Freck v. I.R.S., 37 F.3d 986, 994 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(Taxpayer did not have an opportunity to designate because tax 
payments were made by a third party); McKenzie v. United States, 
536 F.2d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 1976) (Bankruptcy Court found 
evidence established IRS agent told taxpayer he would apply 
payments first to trust fund taxes and, therefore, it was not 
necessary for taxpayer to give specific instructions or 
directions); In re Mallory, 32 B.R. 73, 74 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) 
(Even though government admitted that designation under Rev. Rul. 
73-305 can be oral if the designation is made when the payment is 
tendered, bankruptcy court found no "specific directions" were 
given with the tender of payment); In re T.M. Products, 118 B.R. 
131, 134 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (where IRS's efforts and the 
court orders were specifically directed to the payment of trust 
fund taxes, the bankruptcy court found that the taxpayer was 
entitled to designate and, thus, the IRS could not apply payments 
to non-trust fund taxes after it learned that reorganization was 
no longer possible). 
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 In our view, the record clearly establishes that a  
designation, written or otherwise, was not made with respect to 
any of the payments at issue.  Undeniably, at the September 26, 
1994, hearing before the bankruptcy court, counsel for the 
Kaplans clarified that there was no written agreement to allocate 
tax payments to trust fund liabilities first, nor was there a 
binding oral agreement.  In addition, the evidence suggests that 
a tax return was not filed with the 1990 payment,26 and that a 
designation did not accompany either the payments made before the 
first installment agreement, or those made pursuant to the 
installment agreements.   
 In order to prevail in the absence of a written 
designation, KBS must show that the IRS assured it that the 
payments would be allocated to trust fund taxes first, thereby  
equitably estopping the IRS from changing the allocation at this 
late date.  The evidence of record, however, does not suggest 
that the IRS agreed to apply KBS's payments to trust fund taxes 
first, nor does it show that the Kaplans were led to believe the 
IRS was not contesting designation requests.  Other than the 
statements of the Kaplans, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the designation requests were, in fact, made.   
 In support of its equitable estoppel argument, KBS 
cites In re Jones, 181 B.R. 538, 543-44 (D. Kansas 1995).  That 
                     
26.   A tax return accompanying a payment is considered a 
written designation to apply the payment as shown on the return; 
a payment received without a return is considered undesignated 
and is applied first to the employer's non-trust fund taxes.  
Internal Revenue Manual 56(18)3.1 (11-21-89). 
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case is distinguishable inasmuch as the Chapter 13 debtor had an 
oral agreement with a specifically identified IRS agent.  The 
district court found that there was a running dialogue between 
the agent and the debtor in which the agent made it clear to the 
debtor that the IRS was interested in initially collecting the 
payroll withholding taxes and provided the debtor with an 
incentive to make these payments.  The district court further 
found that the actions of the IRS gave the debtor strong reason 
to believe that his payment would be applied to his withholding 
taxes.  The district court held that the debtor, having shown 
that the elements of equitable estoppel were met,27 was entitled 
to have his payment credited to his withholding tax liability. 
 Unlike In re Jones, the taxpayers here have not 
produced any evidence to suggest that the IRS engaged in conduct 
which could have led the Kaplans and KBS to believe that their 
tax payments were being applied to trust fund taxes first.  KBS's 
equitable estoppel argument, therefore, fails. 
 Accordingly, we find that KBS failed to designate that 
its payments be applied to trust fund taxes first.  The IRS was 
allowed, therefore, to apply the tax payments in the best 
interests of the government. 
                     
27.   The traditional elements of equitable estoppel are:  
"(1) the party to be estopped must have known the facts; (2) the 
party to be estopped must intend that his conduct will be acted 
upon or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has the 
right to believe it was so intended; (3) the party asserting 
estoppel must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the party 
asserting estoppel must rely on the other party's conduct to his 
injury.  In re Jones, 181 B.R. 538, 543 (D. Kansas 1995) (citing 
Penny v. Giuffrida, 897 F.2d 1543, 1545-46 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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 V. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
decisions of the district court. 
